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Tax Plannin 
for Estates 
by Bernard M. Mulvey 
Bernard M. Mulvey, our Director of Tax Re-
search, was with the Appellate Division of the In-
ternal Revenue Service before joining TRB&S. He 
is responsible for the weekly Tax Letter and Tax 
Research Files which emanate from the Executive 
office, and has written numerous articles on taxation. 
His most recent work, which appeared in the May 
issue of TAXES, "Year of Sale Depreciation", will 
be reprinted in the NEW YORK LAW JOURNAL 
shortly. 
A native of New York City, Mr. Mulvey received 
his BS degree from New York University where he 
majored in accounting, and an LLB from St. John's 
University. He is presently completing his require-
ments for an LLM at New York University Gradu-
ate School of Law. 
Mr. Mulvey is chairman of the Legislation and 
Tax Reform Committee of the New York Univer-
sity Tax Society and is also a member of the Federal 
Tax Forum. 
Estate planning today has become a continuing life-
time proposition. An individual with wealth may face 
estate tax problems whenever he is involved in a financial 
or property transaction. His habits of gift-giving, his man-
ner of buying property, the way he solves his marital prob-
lems—all have estate tax consequences. 
However, to say that tax consequences are omnipresent 
is not to say that they should be the tail that wags the 
dog. It is important to remember that the most important 
factor in any estate plan remains the client's wishes for 
the disposition of his money. Any sound estate plan must 
be geared to the client and his particular economic and 
personal situation. Tax considerations alone should never 
dictate the disposition of an estate. 
Tax planning should be undertaken only after what an 
individual wishes to do with his money has been estab-
lished. While good tax plans must and do vary from in-
dividual to individual, there are certain basic tools used 
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by all estate planners in the construction of estate tax 
plans. In the following paragraphs we will discuss many 
of these, incorporating in our discussion several recent 
developments in estate taxation which may necessitate 
changes even in existing estate plans. 
Use of Lifetime Gifts 
The simplest way to reduce an estate tax is to give away 
property during one's lifetime so that there is less in the 
estate to tax at death. While there is a tax on gifts, the 
rates are about 25% lower than the estate tax rates. There 
is a separate set of brackets, permitting a shift from top 
to bottom rates, and the gift is computed at present value, 
which hopefully is less than value at date of death. In 
addition, through the use of the $3,000 annual exclusion 
and the $30,000 lifetime exemption, substantial amounts 
of property may be transferred without incurring any 
tax at all. (A husband and wife, by splitting the gifts made 
by either, may receive an annual exclusion of $6,000 and 
a joint lifetime exemption of $60,000). 
While lifetime gifts may seem a simple method to use, 
in practice there are several pitfalls which must be 
guarded against. For one, only complete gifts or irrev-
ocable transfers in trust in which the settlor relinquishes 
his rights and control over the property can succeed in 
removing the property from the purview of the estate 
tax. There must be a complete surrender of all interest 
and control since, under sections 2036; 2037 and 2038 of 
the Code, an estate tax will be imposed upon any life 
transfer in which: 1) possession or enjoyment is retained 
by the transferor until his death, 2) the transferor re-
tained until his death the right to designate the persons 
who should possess or enjoy the property, 3) the trans-
feror retained a life estate until his death, or 4) the trans-
feror retained the power to alter, amend, revoke or 
terminate the gift until his death. Many a potential donor 
has had strong reservations about making such a com-
plete surrender of his property to his intended bene-
ficiaries during his lifetime! 
One interesting development in this area is the current 
contention by the Internal Revenue Service that an indi-
vidual who takes (or transfers) title to a residence in his 
wife's name, but continues to live in the house for the rest 
of his life, has in effect retained the possession or enjoy-
ment of the property so that the residence is to be in-
cluded in his gross estate upon his death. The IRS has 
sporadically attempted to assert this position in the past 
but early case law provided little support for it, the courts 
generally holding that the property would not be in-
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eluded in the decedent's estate if it was conveyed without 
any valid reservations or conditions whatsoever. On the 
other hand, a recent case1 indicates that the courts are 
now looking more to the actual substance of these trans-
actions to determine if, in fact, a complete and unequivo-
cal gift was made. Thus, a husband who makes a legal 
transfer of residential property to his wife with an oral 
agreement or understanding (whether or not enforceable 
in a court of law) to the effect that he is to enjoy the use 
thereof for his lifetime may now be unsuccessful in any 
attempt to avoid inclusion of the property in his taxable 
estate. 
Even if the donor has made the necessary outright 
transfer of the property in question, there always remains 
the possibility that an estate tax will be imposed if the 
transfer is determined to have been made "in contempla-
tion of death." Under section 2035 of the Code, a re-
buttable presumption is created that any transfer made by 
the decedent within the three year period prior to his 
death is made in contemplation thereof. On the other 
hand, transfers made before such three year period are 
conclusively deemed not to have been made in contempla-
tion of death. Thus, if the donor survives for three years 
after the date of the gift, the Commissioner cannot assert 
that the transfer was motivated by thoughts of death. 
The fact that the donor dies within three years from 
the date of the gift does not ipso facto result in inclusion 
in the estate. If it can be established that a dominant living 
purpose motivated the gift, then the presumption is re-
butted. Thus, in cases involving young and middle-aged 
donors in good health, it is seldom that the "contempla-
tion of death" presumption is not rebutted by the estate. 
Even in situations involving elderly people, when there 
is some doubt whether the transfer will or will not be 
deemed to have been made in contemplation of death, 
such a transfer should still be advised in many cases. If 
death should occur within the three year period the estate 
has the right to introduce facts to prove that the thought 
of death was not the inducement for the gift. At the very 
least, this right gives the estate a powerful weapon in 
bargaining discussions with the Service. In the rare case 
where death occurs during the critical period and the 
gift is conceded to have been made in contemplation 
thereof, any gift tax paid or owed will serve to reduce 
the donor's gross estate by the amount of the gift tax 
(a gift tax is due on the transfer even if the gift was made 
in contemplation of death) . In addition, a credit is given 
against the estate tax for the amount of the gift tax 
paid.2 Because of this so-called double deduction, in 
T H E QUARTERLY 
many cases estate taxes will actually be saved even if the 
gift is deemed in contemplation of death. 
The purchase of property in joint ownership presents 
its own special problems. A common practice is for a 
husband to purchase (with his funds) property in joint 
ownership with his wife or children. It should be noted 
that upon the husband's death the full value of such 
property will be included in his estate for estate tax pur-
poses.3 Moreover, the husband may incur a gift tax lia-
bility at the time the property was purchased in joint 
ownership.4 (Even if the wife did contribute part of the 
purchase price, the full value of the property is still 
presumptively included in the husband's estate. The bur-
den is then placed on the estate to trace back and estab-
lish that the wife's personal funds were so used.) 
Once it is determined that a plan of lifetime gifts 
should be adopted, a decision must then be made as to 
whether the transfers should be in the form of outright 
gifts or in trust. In many instances, an outright gift of 
the property may not be feasible (for example, the bene-
ficiary may be incapable of managing the property). I t is 
still possible to reduce the impact of estate taxes by mak-
ing a gift in trust. To avoid inclusion, however, the trust 
must be an irrevocable and unamendable one (that is, 
the trust does not fall within the provisions of Sections 
2036, 2037 and 2038 discussed above). By transferring 
the property in trust and designating a reliable trustee 
to administer the trust, the beneficiary will be afforded 
the necessary protection. 
In addition, where the total contemplated gift is sub-
stantial, it may be especially advisable to utilize the trust 
form to save an estate tax on the second generation. Thus, 
if a testator were to make a testamentary bequest to his 
son, the property would be subject to an estate tax in his 
estate and, subsequently, in that of his son. However;, if 
the bequest was in the form of a trust which gave the 
income from the property to' the son and, at the death of 
the son, passed the principal to the son's children, there 
would be no inclusion of the principal in the son's estate. 
I t is important to remember that any systematic plan 
of gift-giving should not violate basic planning principles. 
Thus, gifts should not be made which would leave the 
donor frozen, or unable to conduct his usual business 
affairs. Other factors to consider are possible increases in 
the cost of living, later illness and other emergencies, and 
the possible effect on the liquidity of the donor's estate. 
These considerations may very well outweigh the tax 
advantages to be gained by the transfers. A final caveat: 
the plan should always be sufficiently flexible so as to 
permit changes as circumstances might, in future, dictate. 
Use of Life Insurance 
Life insurance is an essential part of most sound estate 
plans. In addition to its ability to protect dependents 
against the loss of the insured's future earning power, it 
can provide liquid funds for payment of estate expenses 
and anticipated tax liabilities, thus precluding any in-
convenience in administering and settling the estate be-
cause of difficulties in obtaining necessary cash. In addi-
tion, this cash liquidity can make unnecessary any forced 
sale of assets (usually at a loss) because of tax-induced 
pressures. 
Life insurance is often used as a means to fund business 
purchase arrangements. Thus, when a client has a partner-
ship interest or owns stock in a close corporation, the 
difficulties of finding a market for his interest at the time 
of his death (or, on the other hand, the desire to ensure 
that his holdings do not fall into alien hands) often 
motivate him to enter into an agreement with his as-
sociates, employees, or the company itself whereby he 
obligates his estate to sell his business interest to the 
contracting party. The party of the second part, in turn, 
obligates himself to purchase the interest at a certain 
specified price. Insurance policies on the individual's life 
often provide the necessary money with which the pur-
chasers meet their obligations under such a contract. 
Under section 2042 of the 1954 Code, proceeds received 
from insurance policies on the life of a decedent are in-
cludible in his gross estate only if the policy is payable 
to his estate or executor or if the decedent retained any 
incidents of ownership in the policy at the time of his 
death. Incidents of ownership include the power to assign 
the policy, to borrow on the policy, and to designate or 
change the beneficiaries of the policy. Section 2042 re-
pealed the premium payment test existing under the 
1939 Code so that the mere payment of the insurance 
premiums by the insured is no longer a ground, in and 
of itself, for inclusion of the proceeds in his gross estate. 
It is now possible, therefore, for a person to transfer sub-
stantial amounts of assets free of transfer taxes (except 
perhaps the gift tax) through premium payments on 
policies on his own life. As seen above, as long as said 
person is not the owner of any of the incidents of owner-
ship in the policy at the time of his death, and his estate 
is not the beneficiary of the policy, Section 2042 will not 
be applicable. 
One cautionary note should be sounded, however. The 
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insurance provision in the Code has never been regarded 
as exclusive and insurance proceeds not includible in the 
gross estate under section 2042 may still be taxed as 
property transferred in contemplation of death, or as a 
transfer intended to take effect at death. Thus the Com-
missioner has, in the past, repeatedly attacked transfers 
of insurance made within three years of the transferor's 
death under the "contemplation of death" provision. 
In recent days, the Service has been contending that 
even the premiums paid on such policies by the insured 
within the three years preceding his death constitute gifts 
in contemplation of death under the statute. In this vein, 
there is some indication that the Service, relying on Lieb-
mann v Hassett5 (a case which arose under the 1934 Act) 
will attempt to include in the gross estate not just the 
given premiums but, instead, that portion of the total 
proceeds of the policy which the premiums deemed paid 
in contemplation of death bear to the total premiums 
paid. 
There are at least two possible taxpayer counter-attacks 
to this new Treasury onslaught. First, the taxpayer can 
argue that, in view of the legislative history affecting life 
insurance, it would seem that the Treasury is attempting 
(at least in part) to reintroduce the premium payments 
test which was expressly repudiated by Congress when 
it enacted section 2042 of the 1954 Code. However, in 
the writer's opinion, such an argument would be ineffec-
tive to prevent the inclusion in the gross estate of at least 
the actual premium cost paid by the decedent during 
the three years before his death. It is doubtful that the 
courts would go along with the thesis that a gift which 
is made in contemplation of death to pay life insurance 
premium costs should be treated differently from any 
other gift made in contemplation of death. 
On the other hand, the legislative intent argument 
might be successful in countering any Treasury attempt 
to include in the decedent's estate a portion of the insur-
ance proceeds based on the relationship between pre-
miums paid during the critical period and the total 
premiums paid. While it is true that in Liebmann v 
Hassett (which arose before there was a premium pay-
ments test) the court included in the gross estate of the 
decedent that portion of the proceeds of the insurance 
policy which was related to the premiums he paid, the 
court was basically faced with the problem of valuing a 
gift of a life insurance policy which it had initially deter-
mined to be part of the decedent's gross estate because 
it had been made in contemplation of death. Thus, policy 
proceeds were placed in the insured's estate in Liebmann 
because a gift of the policy had been made in contempla-
tion of death; not because the insured had paid any or 
all premiums in contemplation of death. 
A second possible counter-attack can be derived from 
the statute itself. It should be remembered from the 
previous discussion that section 2035 only creates a re-
buttable presumption that any gift made within three 
years of death is made in contemplation thereof. Thus, 
even if one were to assume that section 2035 does have 
applicability in the area of insurance premium payments 
(which in the writer's opinion it does), it is important 
to note that a transfer involving life insurance does not 
in and of itself create an inference of contemplation of 
death. If the taxpayer can show that a dominant living 
purpose motivated the payment of the premiums by the 
insured (e.g. payments were made pursuant to the pro-
visions of a separation agreement), there will be no in-
clusion in the insured's gross estate by virtue of section 
2035. 
While these two approaches may have to be relied 
upon in current cases involving decedents, it is possible 
to avoid the predicament completely by proper estate 
planning which would ensure that the beneficiary himself 
pays the premiums after the policy has been transferred 
to him. This may not be such an easy undertaking. 
If the beneficiary is capable of paying the premiums 
from his own financial sources, there is no difficulty. How-
ever, more often than not, a gift of life insurance is made 
to a spouse or other object of the insured's bounty who 
lacks sufficient personal funds to make the premium pay-
ments. If the insured were merely to transfer the neces-
sary funds to the beneficiary who, in turn, made the 
necessary payments, it is likely that the government would 
contend that the insured indirectly had made the pay-
ments. However, whether or not the government has 
authority to trace back through the years the sources of 
premium payments, as it did under prior law, remains 
to be seen. 
A good approach to obviate this line of attack (using 
for example purposes the husband-wife relationship) 
might be to have the husband revise his estate planning 
techniques. By adopting a systematic plan of making 
outright gifts of property having an income potential to 
his wife during his lifetime, the husband can provide his 
spouse with an independent source of income (that is, 
one in which no restrictions are imposed as to the use of 
the income). Subsequently, if the wife were to take out 
a policy on her husband's life (naming herself as bene-
ficiary) , or the husband were to transfer an existing policy 
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to his wife, relinquishing all incidents of ownership, she 
would then be in a position to make the premium pay-
ments. In this way, no part of the insurance proceeds or 
premiums would be included in the husband's gross 
estate (assuming the husband lived in excess of three 
years from the date the policy was transferred), since 
case6 law has held that whereas the principal property 
transferred by a husband to a wife is traceable back to the 
husband, the income from such principal is deemed to 
be the sole property of the donee wife, ab initio. Of 
course, the husband must pay a gift tax on the value of 
the transferred property and/or the life insurance policy, 
but this would be at a substantially lower rate. 
No discussion of the latest developments in this in-
surance area would be complete without reference to the 
recent Supreme Court decision in Commissioner v Noel.7 
In the Noel case the Third Circuit had held that the 
proceeds from an airplane accident insurance policy 
(commonly called flight insurance) were not includible 
in a decedent's gross estate as "life insurance" under sec-
tion 2042(2). The court reasoned that, unlike the life 
insurance policy, such a contract was in effect an agree-
ment to indemnify the insured (or in case of death, his 
beneficiary) for any loss sustained by reason of a certain 
event (an accident) which might or might not occur. 
Life insurance, on the other hand, was deemed to be a 
contract by which the insurer agreed to pay a specified 
sum upon the occurrence of an inevitable event (the 
death of the insured), regardless of its cause. The Court, 
in construing section 2042(2), held that its purpose was 
to encompass only the regular type of life insurance poli-
cies in which it could be said that the insured acquired 
an immediate estate, and not accident policies in which 
neither insured nor beneficiary acquired anything more 
than a defeasible right. 
The Supreme Court, however, rejected the Third 
Circuit viewpoint in its holding that Federal estate taxes 
could be collected on flight insurance proceeds. In the 
Court's viewpoint, the only way in which such taxation 
could be avoided would be for the insured to irrevocably 
sign away his right to the policy, including his right to 
change the beneficiary. (It would seem to the writer, 
however, that any such irrevocable transfer of rights will 
inevitably be attacked by the Service under the "contem-
plation of death" provisions). 
Use of the Marital Deduction 
As provided in section 2056 of the Internal Revenue 
Code, there may be deducted from the gross estate of a 
decedent an amount equal to the value of property passing 
to his surviving spouse to the extent that such property 
does not exceed 50% of the decedent's "adjusted gross 
estate." In general, the "adjusted gross estate" is equal to 
the gross estate reduced by the amount of any community 
property included therein and less expenses, claims, losses 
and certain taxes. 
This marital deduction is one of the most important 
tax savings devices for estate planners. When properly 
utilized, it can effectuate substantial savings in the trans-
fer taxes paid by a family in passing its wealth from one 
generation to the next. However, a word of caution — 
the courts construe the marital deduction provision strictly 
and deny the benefits thereof in cases where the terms of 
the instrument are at variance with the requirements of 
the Code. 
The basic requirement in section 2056 is that property 
qualifying for the marital deduction must be includible 
in the surviving spouse's gross estate if still in his or her 
possession at time of death (the terminable interest re-
striction) . The simplest form of qualifying provision is 
an outright bequest to the spouse. On the other hand, an 
example of a bequest that would be disqualified is one 
"to my spouse for life, remainder to x" since, in this 
latter case, the value of the subject property would not 
be included in the surviving spouse's estate upon death. 
As can be seen from the above, problems in this area 
will arise when, for one reason or another, an outright 
gift to the surviving spouse is considered inadvisable. (For 
example, a husband wishing his wife to receive income 
from a marital trust solely, can qualify the trust for the 
deduction by granting the surviving spouse a general 
power of appointment as to the remainder.) In such case, 
careful will drafting is called for to ensure that the dispo-
sition does not violate the terminable interest provisions. 
One recent development in this area has been the issu-
ance of Revenue Procedure 64-19.8 The background 
prompting its issuance was as follows. Soon after the 
marital deduction was first introduced into the tax law, 
estate planners devised ingenious formulas to ensure that 
the deceased's estate would receive the maximum marital 
deduction (that is, fifty percent of the adjusted gross 
estate). The so-called pecuniary formula bequest was in-
troduced under which, in terms, the surviving spouse 
was left property in an amount exactly equal to fifty 
percent of the testator's adjusted gross estate, as finally 
determined for estate tax purposes (less property passing 
to the widow outside the will but includible in the gross 
estate). 
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Problems arose when the assets in the estate appre-
ciated before the date of distribution over their federal 
estate tax values. Under the income tax laws, the satis-
faction of a pecuniary bequest with such appreciated 
property would result in a capital gain to the estate.9 
The problem was met by the use of a provision in con-
junction with any formula bequest which permitted the 
executor to satisfy the marital bequest by a distribution 
in cash or in kind, at values as finally determined for 
estate tax purposes. 
This power granted to the executor enabled him to 
manipulate the assets in the estate so that in many cases 
the estate got the full fifty percent marital deduction 
when much less than fifty percent of the estate (at date 
of distribution values) was distributed to the widow. 
Particularly in cases where the wife had a substantial 
estate of her own, the executor would allocate to- her 
those assets that had depreciated in value from the federal 
estate tax valuation date. The appreciated assets were, in 
turn, diverted over to the residuary beneficiaries (usually 
the children). 
Revenue Procedure 64-19 attempts to solve the prob-
lem by setting forth certain rules whereby the marital 
deduction will be allowed in the full amount of a pecu-
niary bequest if under applicable state law or by the 
express or implied provisions of the will either: 
1) the fiduciary must distribute in satisfaction there-
of assets having a market value on the date or dates of 
distribution at least equal to the amount of the bequest, or 
2) the fiduciary must distribute assets, including cash, 
fairly representative of appreciation or depreciation in 
the value of all property available for distribution. 
If the estate cannot show that either of these require-
ments is met, the Service presumably will disallow a mari-
tal deduction for the bequest. 
Ever since the marital deduction was first introduced 
in the Internal Revenue Code, estate planners have de-
vised elaborate schemes for its maximum utilization. In 
too many instances, the testator's wishes have been sacri-
ficed solely to effectuate a savings in the estate tax. It 
should be emphasized that a married estate owner is 
not compelled to use the marital deduction. Thus, if a 
client doesn't want his wife to have the requisite degree 
of control over the property or even if he just prefers 
to leave the bulk of his property to> someone other than 
his wife, his wishes should control. Again, if his wife has 
a substantial estate of her own, any estate tax savings 
now through the use of the marital deduction may sub-
ject her estate to even greater estate taxes. In short, the 
point to keep in mind is that the marital deduction is 
merely a device to save taxes and, in common with simi-
lar devices discussed above, should never be recom-
mended or employed without careful consideration of 
all relevant factors. 
Conclusion 
Once an estate tax plan is decided upon, using any or 
all of the devices mentioned above, it should not then 
be pigeon-holed pending the eventuality of death. A 
system of periodic review should be adopted so that the 
plan can be reexamined in the light of the current family 
and economic conditions and the ever-continuing evolu-
tion of estate tax provisions. 
The time has long since passed when a standard-form 
will, purchased at the corner drug store, constituted an 
adequate estate plan. However, unlike the income tax 
area, there is still a high degree of unawareness as to 
possible alternatives and elections in this ever-growing 
field. Expert advice should be utilized at all stages of the 
estate planning process so that the fruits of a lifetime of 
work are not dissipated. 
If the entire estate planning team, the accountant, the 
attorney, the insurance man, and the trust officer, co-
operate in the planning process, the benefit of the ex-
perience, knowledge, and advice of each in his separate 
field can be coordinated to provide a plan to satisfy the 
client's wishes and, at the same time, take advantage of 
the best methods of minimizing taxes. 
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